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CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

CULTURE CLUB OR THE CLASH?
HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AESTHETIC
UNIFORMITY AND ARTISTIC FREEDOM
"Man is in this world to do more than pay taxes and brush his
teeth - and that is where the arts come in."'
INTRODUCTION

A brilliant contemporary artist paints a challenging political
image on the side of a building with the permission of its owner.
Days later, the owner receives a letter demanding the image be
removed because the artist failed to apply for a permit from the
city's historic preservation commission. The artist believes the
work is protected under both the First Amendment and the artist's
moral rights. After consulting an attorney, the artist learns that
historic preservation ordinances enjoy broad legal support and his
chances of prevailing are slim. The building owner calls the artist
and states that if the work is not removed he will be fined by the
city. Thus, the artist becomes entangled in a battle between artistic
speech and the government's historic preservation efforts.
Part I gives a brief introduction of the rapid growth and support
of historic preservation law in the United States. Part I also
describes how the broad authority granted to local preservation
commissions empowers commissions to mandate aesthetic
uniformity. The question springing from a commission's ability to
enforce aesthetic standards is whether that authority functions as a
governmental guise for censorship of the arts. Part II provides a
brief background of public art, American moral rights and the legal
implications when certain segments of the population find a public
Part III merges historic preservation
work objectionable.
1. 136 CONG. REC. H3111-02, H3114 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Markey quoting Harold Clurman).
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ordinances with artistic freedom and examines their potential
collision. Part III ultimately asks whether historic preservation
ordinances potentially function as a governmental guise for
censorship of the arts. Finally, this comment examines the scant
case law detailing the subtle battle between historic preservation
and artistic freedom and proposes clarification of the procedures
and standards available to artists seeking to display a work in an
historic district. This comment also argues that recent moral rights
legislation grants an artist a constitutionally cognizable injury
when public art is removed or altered by a preservation
enforcement commission.
I. BACKGROUND OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION

A. The National Historic PreservationAct
The National Historic Preservation Act of 19662 (NHPA) is the
primary piece of federal legislation illustrating America's efforts
to preserve our heritage and culturally significant structures.3 The
growth of historic preservation districts and particular properties
and structures under federal, state, and local protection are rooted
in efforts to honor our heritage and culture.4 Since its inception,
the NHPA has enjoyed broad acceptance in courtrooms and with
the public.5 The NHPA provides federal protection, but is also
heavily reliant upon local initiative.6 The NHPA grants authority
for a National Register of Historic Places, a grant-in aid program
2. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000).
3. Id. The NHPA is intended to entrust government to act as a trustee of the
historic properties or structures. Id.

4. Id.
5. A Layperson's Guide to Historic Preservation Law, SG040 ALI-ABA 1,
11 (2001) [hereinafter Layperson] (stating more than 2,300 historic preservation
ordinances exist across the country to date). See also David L. Callies, Historic
PreservationLaw in the United States, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10348 (2002) (stating
all fifty states and over 500 individual municipalities have ordinances requiring
preservation).
6. Layperson, supra, note 5 at 6.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss2/3

2

Binetti: Culture Club or The Clash? Historic Preservation, Aesthetic Unifo

2003]

CUL TURE CL UB OR THE CLASH

315

promoting preservation and registration. The NHPA also grants
authority for a Federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
which polices federal agencies and projects affecting historic

sites.7
B. The FederalRegister of Historic Places
For local preservation initiatives, the key aspect of the NHPA is
the Federal Register of Historic Places.8 A local governmental
body may suggest protection of a property or structure for listing
in the National Register.9 Certification of a property or structure
requires the local governmental body to comport with certain
guidelines, including the establishment of a preservation
commission and operation of its own preservation program to
protect the properties and structures.'" Local initiative is generally

7. 16 U.S.C. § 470a, 470b, 470f, 470j. See also Callies, supra note 5, at
10356 (outlining American historic preservation law and the NHPA's federal
benefits).
8. Layperson, supra note 5, at 6.
9. Id.
10. Callies, supra note 5, at 10357 (citing Julian C. Juergensmeyer &
Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Control Law, 584 (West Group
1998.) The general requirements for designation of an historic structure or
property in the National Register criteria are:
The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology,
engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures,
and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling, and association and:
that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution
to the broad patterns of out history; or
that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or
that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period or method of
construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high
artistic value, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity
whose components may lack individual distinction; or
that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in
pre-history or history.
36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2002).
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responsible for nominating preservation properties.1'
Listing a property or structure in the Registry is "primarily
honorific."12 However, tax incentives are given to private owners
for rehabilitating and maintaining historic properties or
structures. 3
Once registered, enforcement of the historic
preservation ordinance becomes an important issue.
C. Local PreservationOrdinanceEnforcement Commissions

The most important aspect of historic preservation for purposes
of this comment is the local preservation enforcement commission.
Many historic properties or structures, while listed in the Federal
Register, are actually protected through local ordinance. 4 A local
ordinance typically includes the formation of a preservation
commission as the administrative body that carries out the goals
and objectives of the ordinance. 5 However, the qualifications,
procedures and personal biases of enforcement officials are open
to criticism. 6
11. Callies, supra note 5, at 10357 (citing Julian C. Juergensmeyer &
Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Control Law, 584 (West Group
1998.)
12. Callies, supra note 5 at 6 (indicating that listing a property or structure in
the National Registry carries little legal significance).
13. 36 C.F.R. § 60.2(c) (2002). See also, Callies, supra note 5, at 10355
(listing tax incentives among the federal benefits of registering a property with
the federal government). In addition to the tax incentives for properties and
structures listed in the Federal Registry, federal grants and loans are offered. Id.
at 10354. In 1995 the Federal Government donated $30,940 million to perform
preservation-related activities. An Overview of Federal Historic Preservation
Law, SG040 ALI-ABA 57, 61 (1996) [hereinafter Overview].
14. Overview, supra note 13 at 61.
15. Id.
16. Note that the appointed enforcement officials typically have some
credentials in relevant areas, such as real estate and architecture. Layperson,
supra, note 5 at 12. The commissions usually require parties seeking to alter or
add to a protected property or structure to apply for a permit from the
commission. Id. at 13. During the permit review process, commissions are
bound by constitutional concerns of notice and due process. Id. at 27. A
hearing is generally held before property is designated for protection under local
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A large aspect of American culture is rapid development, which
has resulted in the destruction of treasured structures and
property.Y" Another important American cultural value is
It is against this
protecting free expression of our artists."
backdrop that this comment explores the tension between
preserving aesthetic uniformity and an artist's unfettered right to
ordinance. Id. "Notice must be both timely and sufficiently clear so that
affected individuals will be able to appear and contest issues in a meaningful
way." Id.
Commission members are supposed to be unbiased, but this notion has been
challenged by some who view commissions as inherently biased and generally
in favor of preservation. Id. at 28. In fact, commission members "must avoid
prejudging a case or exhibiting personal animosity against any particular
individual." Id. However, commission members are able to prevent the
appearance of personal animosity by allowing community members at an open
permit hearing to criticize those seeking to alter/add-on/destroy a protected
property or structure. For example, a hypothetical situation where it is relatively
easy, if a commission member is so inclined, to find members of the community
who oppose any alteration to a protected property and allow them to present
Subsequently, when the
biased and prejudiced views of the proposal.
commission votes on the propriety of a proposal, it may escape the appearance
of bias by indicating it decided the matter independently.
17. Julia D. Mahoney, PerpetualRestrictions on Land & the Problem of the
Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 741 (2002). See generally John Harte, Land Use,
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge of PreservingEarth's Life
Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929, 930 (2001) (discussing "unwise use of
land" and the resulting biological problems); Keith Hirokaw, Some Pragmatic
Observations About Radical Critique in Environmental Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 225, 264 (2002) (discussing classic property rights and environmentalism);
Sanford E. Gaines, Triangulating Sustainable Develo.pment: International
Trade, Environmental Protection and Development, 32 E.L.R. 10318, 10318
(2002) (discussing twentieth century environmental destruction and advocating
sustainable development), but see Environmental Movement Timeline, a History
available
at
Environmental
Movement,
of
American
5,
(last
visited
March
http://www.ecotopia.org/ehof/timeline.html
2003)(outlining American steps to afford greater protection to the natural
environment).
18. See Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 366-67 (2000) (discussing the long tradition of
protection of artist's works under American copyright law since the inception of
the United States).
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free expression and speech.
II. BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC ART: THE OLD ENIGMA

A. The "Public" Problem of PublicArt
Art is a vehicle for an individual's expression, a visual
commentary or reflection of one's experiences. When a work is
created, the creator alone channels from within a way to display
experiences and values. 9 When, for example, a contemporary
artist displays a controversial mural on the side of downtown
building, economic, political, cultural, and educational issues
emerge.2"
Controversies arising when art becomes viewable by the general
public are well documented by legal scholars.21 The question is
19. Amy Adler, The Thirty Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial
Lectures: The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 205, 206. On the other
hand, art has been criticized as "pointless self-indulgence" (and even described
as "decadent irrelevance"). Id. at 208.
20. Barbara Hoffman, Law for Art's Sake in the Public Realm, 16 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 39, 39 (1991). It is important to accent the competing
interests and public disapproval of public art. For example, in 1988, an historic
mural painted in 1967 by Edward A. Kane, Sr. in Edwardsville, Illinois came
under the scope of subject matter controversy. Id. at 47. The mural contained a
figure readily interpreted as African-American with a rope of bondage cut. Id.
The local African-American community objected, finding the mural a symbol of
the slaves freed in the town by one of Illinois' early governors. Id.
Another example of the controversy involving publicly displayed works of art
occurred in Washington State's House of Representatives. Id. at 46. A mural
created by Michael Spafford was labeled pornographic, after "complaints that its
suggestive nature caused children to giggle." Id. Washington lawmakers
objected to perceived sexual overtones of Hercules slaughtering Hippolyta, and
"found a scene of Hercules wrestling with death, represented by a skeleton, a
depressing sort of theme." Id. A wise retraction was made in 1989 when the
Washington legislature finally uncovered the murals. Id. at 47.
21. See generally Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir. 1970)
(finding an "assault upon individual privacy" regarding sexually controversial
paintings displayed in a student center at a university); Marci A. Hamilton, Art
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how can we protect an artist's right to freely express herself and
simultaneously expect to appease a large audience, many members
of which have no training or particular appreciation for
challenging art. How can society first harmonize the idea that art

is free to mortify or scare us22 while securing the public's right to
avoid such works? 23 A brief look at America's hesitant embrace of
Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 73 (1996) (arguing "First Amendment
jurisprudence should reflect art's integral role in preserving the constitutional
balance between the governed and the governing"); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint
Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 99 (1996) (outlining
discrimination and restrictions on art in public spaces); Daniel Mach, The Bold
and the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, and the FirstAmendment, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 383 (1997) (claiming that, "[a]rt has become a battleground on which
American society fights its most intensely political and deeply personal wars,"
and discussing the difficulty of adjudicating public art disputes); Amy Sabrin,
Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in Government
Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1209 (1993) (discussing the
constitutionality of consideration of content in awarding grants to artists); and
Pamela Weinstock, The National Endowment for the Arts Funding Controversy
and the Miller Test: A plea for the Reunification of Art and Society, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 803, 803 (1992) (focusing on art and obscenity, the Miller Test for
obscenity and proposing alternative means for judging obscenity in
contemporary art).
22. For interesting commentary on offensive art see generally Jesse Helms,
Is it Art or Tax-Paid Obscenity? The NEA Controversy, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 99, 99
(1994) (arguing America is in a cultural war between traditional Judeo-Christian
segments of the population and those in favor of "radical moral relativism");
Amy Ruth Ita, Censorial Community Values: An UnconstitutionalTrend in Arts
Funding and Access, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1725, 1725 (2000) ( discussing why the
use of censorial
community values is unconstitutional
viewpoint
discrimination); Anne Salzman, Live Art and the Audience: Toward a SpeakerFocused Freedom of Expression, 34 HA:RV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 437 (1999)
(documenting the live performance where former Pentecostal minister Ron
Athey carved designs into the back of an HIV-positive "drag queen," soaked up
the blood with paper towels, and hung the towels over the viewing audience);
and Anne Salzman, On the Offensive: Protecting Visual Art with Sexual Content
Under the First Amendment and the "Less Valuable Speech" Label, 55 U. PITT.
L.REv. 1215, 1215 (1994) (discussing the effects of the "Less Valuable Speech"
label).
23. Julie A. Shaya, Can the Government Regulate Expression in the Public
Forum? 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 893, 894 (1993) (exploring whether the
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the concept of moral rights24 and increased artist control is an
important step in understanding this balancing act of competing
interests.
B. American MoralRights of the Artist: Growing Acceptance
Imagine a marketing firm spotting the exterior wall of a store
located on a busy street and contemplating how many people every
day would see its advertisement there. When denied permission to
use the wall, the firm finds that fifty years ago the former store
owners, now long deceased, allowed a neighborhood artist and
youth group to paint a mural depicting the economic plight of
Mexican Americans. 25 This situation implicates the abstract, noneconomic moral rights of the artist and their potentially adverse
effect on economic and property rights of the marketing firm.
Moral rights stand for the principle, "if only in a very limited
application, [that] an artist retains a personality interest,
independent of his economic interests, in the physical object of his
creation, even if he no longer owns the object."26 That is, the artist
government is within its fights in limiting certain forms of expression through
restrictive funding). Shaya notes that the government is not obliged to fund all
forms of expression or to encourage and approve of its content, and that it is
allowed to impose restrictions on obscene or lewd expression in the name of
preserving public morals.
24. For an analysis of state and federal moral rights statutes see Brian T.
McCartney, Creepings and Glimmers of the Moral Rights ofArtists in American
Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35, 55-70 (1998) (comparing extensive
European and relatively limited American support of moral rights).
25. Sheila Muto, Muralists See the Writing on the Wall: It's a Billboard,
WALL ST. J. (Cal.), July 14, 1999, at CAL. The author discusses recent case
where a Visual Artists Rights Act suit involving the mural "Extinct," which was
located on the exterior wall of a hotel. Id. When the owner attempted to lease
the wall to a billboard company to be used as advertisement, the dispute was
resolved when the hotel owner allowed the artist to recreate the mural on
another wall of the same hotel. Id.
26. Christopher J. Robinson, The "Recognized Stature" Standard in the
Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1975 (2000). See also
Betsy
Rosenblatt,
"Moral
Rights
Basics,"
available
at
http ://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property/library/moralprimer.html
(last visited
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may have sold the work or disposed of it in another manner, but
thereafter the artist is still protected from destruction, alteration, or
removal of the work. 7 The author's moral rights "are perpetual,

inalienable, and descend to the heirs of the author, even after the
author transfers the economic rights
8
company.

to another person or

With America's growing acceptance of the moral rights of an
artist,29 it will become increasingly difficult to order works
January 31, 2003) (stating moral rights protect a personal interest and not
merely a monetary one).
27. John Henry Merryman & Albert E. Elsen, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL

ARTS 593 (Kluwerlaw International Ltd. 1998) (1979). The concept of moral
rights "recognizes the artist's authorship by preserving the integrity of the work
and protecting against its deformation and destruction without the artist's
consent." Id.
28. Ronald B. Standler, "Moral Rights of Authors in the USA," available at
http://www.rbs2.com/moral.htm (last visited January 31, 2003). The United
States gives limited recognition of some moral rights in order to comply with
the Berne Convention. Id.
29. Other countries, particularly France, include additional moral rights. Id.
These additional moral rights include the rights of disclosure and withdrawal as
well as the right to reply to criticism. Id. The right of disclosure gives the
author the ultimate decision "on when and where to publish." Id. The right to
withdraw states that "when an author's views change, the author may purchase
at wholesale the price all of the remaining copies of the author's work, then
prevent printing of more copies." Id. The right to reply to criticism gives the
author the right to reply to a critic and have such reply published in same
publication used by the critic. Id.
The right to withdraw is controversial as it "permits the author to retrieve her
work even though it has been sold or published." Jack A. Cline, Moral Rights:
The Long and Winding Road Toward Recognition, 14 NOVA L. REV. 435
(1990), reprintedin Anthony D'Amato and Doris Estelle Long, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY, 112, 121. If an author, even years after

sale of a work, "experiences a change of heart" regarding the work or what it
represents, "an artist can recall her creation." Id. Often, the right to withdraw
only applies to literary works. Id.
There has been substantial criticism of moral rights. The lack of standards for
deciding moral rights cases "imposes an arduous burden on the courts and the
media industry." Arthur B. Sackler, The United States Should Not Adhere to the
Berne Copyright Convention, 3 J.L. & TECH. 207 (1987), reprinted in D'Amato
and Long, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY, 129. In the
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removed (even years after their purchase or commission) or to
An
question the propriety of publicly displayed works.
evolutionary glimpse of the incompatibility of moral rights with
American culture 3' and American courts' treatment of legal and
artistic issues is helpful in understanding moral rights.
Before the recognition of limited moral rights in America, artists
had a difficult time maintaining the condition of their works after
the work's completion. For example, in Crimi v. Rutgers
PresbyterianChurch in New York,3" the court held the artist had no
right to prevent the destruction of his mural once the painting was
finished.32 Crimi was decided prior to the Visual Artists Rights
Act and state statutes protecting moral rights. In this case, Plaintiff
won a contest held by defendant to paint a mural on the rear wall
of defendant's church.33 The copyright in the work was assigned
to the church. 34 The parishioners of the church successfully argued

near future courts will have to wrestle with the question "whether an alteration
to a film or manuscript is a mutilation or a judicious edit." Id. Indeed,
"practitioners will have no basis for determining moral rights violations and will
rely on ad hoc subjective interpretations." Id. See also supra note 26
(proposing a subjective sliding scale standard which incorporates the totality of
the circumstances when preservation enforcement commissions consider artist
applications).
30. Russel J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A
Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1980), reprinted in, D'Amato and Long, supra note 29 at
137. DaSilva notes that while the Constitution mandates copyright law in
America, in France copyright is a "natural right" and in Germany copyright is a
"right of personalty." Id. In contrast, the constitutionally mandated copyright
protection in America arising from "the sovereign's interest in promoting a
socially desirable end." Id. Thus, when compared to "Civil Law system(s), the
Id. The
American tradition seems mechanical and uncompassionate."
American system focuses on society's best interest, while civil law countries
tend to focus on the individual author's interest. Id. Critics of moral rights in
America argue that the current system "aims more at social balancing than at
unilaterally vindicating the artist's personal interests." Id.
31. 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. 1949).
32. ld. at 819.
33. Id. at 813
34. Id. at 814.
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their objection to the mural's portrayal of Christ's bare chest, and
the court allowed the mural to be painted over without notifying
the artist.35 The decision in that case would likely be different in
light of American courts' recent and growing support of moral
rights.3 6
The limited recognition of some moral rights in America
dramatically altered the case law pertaining to an artist's
continuing personality interest in a work. In a particularly notable
case that took place amid growing recognition of moral rights, a
California federal court awarded a muralist more than $48,000 in
damages, attorneys' fees and costs37 under the federal Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA").38 In that case, operators of
35. Id.
36. A monumental case furthering the development of American moral rights
was Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d. Cir. 1976)
(holding American television network could not edit and cut plaintiffs'
originally unedited skit comedy show).
37. Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 97-CV-7470 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998)
(unpublished), in 4 No. 23 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. Rep. 3 (1998).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). VARA is federal legislation that seeks to protect
artists' rights. VARA provides that certain creative artists:
(1)
shall
have
the
right(A)
to
claim
authorship
of
that
work,
and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual
art
which
he
or
she
did
not
create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author
of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor
or
reputation;
and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the
right(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification
of
that
work
is
a
violation
of
that
right,
and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of
that right.
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a liquor store partially destroyed a mural plaintiff and 300
neighborhood children painted on the faqade of the store.39 The
72-foot-long mural was part of a community improvement project
that featured anti-drug, anti-alcohol and anti-smoking themes.4 °
The court held that while the building belonged to defendants, the
mural belonged to plaintiff under VARA. 4 The court's award to
the muralist highlights the operation of moral rights protections; it
is an abstract injury completely separate from questions of
property title and economics. Subsequent cases upholding moral
rights follow this analysis and seriously limit the precedential
value of Crimi4 2 and its progeny.
Thus, with increased recognition of moral rights of artists, the
tension between public art and a disapproving public stiffens. As
American courts uphold rights of authors never before recognized,
39. Hanrahan, No. 97-CV-7470 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998)(unpublished) in 4

No. 23 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 3 (1998).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. In Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 280 Cal.Rptr. 535 (Cal. App. 3d 1991),
defendants convinced the trial judge that a mural was not a "painting" under the
California Art Preservation Act and therefore not protected by the Act. Id. at
536. The muralists in Botello sued after painting a large mural in 1980 on the
wall of a service station owned by defendant. Id. In 1988, defendants
authorized the destruction of the wall to which the mural was affixed to make
room for a parking lot. Id. On appeal, because neither side cited any earlier
cases holding a mural is considered a painting, the court held a mural is, indeed,
a painting and remanded the case. Id. The case was eventually settled. Id. at
540. See also, United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71, 73 (1892) (citing wall panels
as "paintings").
In addition to Botello, in an unlitigated case, plaintiffs received $200,000 for the
destruction of their mural in San Francisco. Hanrahan,No. 97-CV-7470 (C.D.

Cal. June 3, 1998)(unpublished) in 4 No. 23 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG.
Rep. 3 (1998). The Latino community in and around San Francisco thought the
mural particularly valuable especially since one of the muralists trained under
the great Diego Rivera. Id. The mural was whitewashed in 1998 by the new
owners of the building, who claim they were unaware their purchase of the
building did not include the rights to the mural. Id. This case proves to be one
of the largest settlements to date involving a VARA claim and is indicative,
when compared to Crimi, of the attitude shift in the courts regarding the rights
of artists in their works post-creation. Id.
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the ability of opponents to turn to the legal system to remove or

alter works of public art is severely limited.43 Moreover, the
increased recognition of moral rights shows America's continuing
effort to protect unfettered artistic expression." However, the role

of art in a democratic society has perhaps never been more in
question.4 5

America's support for both artistic expression and

43. Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 795, 802 (2001). Moral rights "underscores the personality
interest of the author" and "protects against significant alteration of the work or
such derogatory use of it that is contrary to the author's intentions." Id.
44. Id.
45. Addressing the artists' rights and the inherent tension involved with
public art must include an examination of the value society gives the voice of its
artists. See Rene Linton, The Artistic Voice: Is it in Danger of Being Silenced?,
32 CAL. W.L. REV. 195, 195 (1995) (stating "good art moves your emotions or
makes you think... [i]t deserves both our attention and our protection").
Discussion of art's place in the modem world centers upon the notion of the
democratic public sphere, controversial speech, and widespread public debate.
See Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies
and the Demise of Dialogue,46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1473, 1488 (1994) (claiming

present jurisprudence renders the U.S. Constitution "irrelevant" and arguing for
more open dialogue by lawmakers).
The idea of a public forum where debate thrives is central to the notion of
democracy. See generally Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional
Transformation, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 133, 133 (1993). Hannah Arendt's idea
of the "public realm" is "the arena in which members of the public meet, and
where competing values, interests, expectations and goals are open for
discussion and modification." Hoffman, supra note 20 at 40 (citing Hanah
Arendt, The Human Condition (1958)). See also Jurgen Habermas, The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., MIT Press
1989) (describing open public fora as a display of competing interests and
cultural understandings); and Robert C. Post, The Concept of the Public, 13 Sw.
Soc. Sci. Q. 311, 311 (1933) (explaining American sociologists in the 1930s
viewed the "public" as "capable of destroying barriers" and viewing favorably
critical interaction and discourse). There can be no democratic public until we
have the ability to challenge and communicate regardless of cultural boundary.
This comment assumes art does have an important and unmatched place in our
society. See generally, Sheldon Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic
Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L.
REV. 221, 224 n. 12, 227. Many among us find solace in a painter's ability to
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historic preservation can present awkward disputes when an artist
seeks to publicly display an aesthetically challenging work within
a preservation district.

1II.

HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND ARTISTIC FREEDOM

When viewing historic preservation and artistic freedom
simultaneously, it is not difficult to envision potential conflict. For
portray a familiar feeling visually, or a lyricist's melody that lends comfort in
time of doubt. Indeed, many people derive political, social, and educational
philosophies more from creative expression than from politicians, teachers, or
even family. For example, many of us hear our own political sensibilities when
someone like artist Raymond Lark comments that "I am really not concerned
what people have to say about my subject matter ... [i]t is obvious that said
critics are not that familiar with my wide range of subject matter. Whenever you
start to dictate to an artist his 'social responsibility' you get into an area of
censorship. Artists should feel free to record whatever is important or interesting
to them." Edward Smith and Co., Raymond Lark Index Page, available at
http://smithlarkwright.com/rl/quotes.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). To
excuse art as politically and socially irrelevant is to deprive oneself and society
of history and the unique undertones of our existence. 136 CONG. REC. H31 11,
H3115 (daily ed. June 5, 1990). Representative Fish of New York commented
at the VARA debates that art must be protected because "it is paramount to the
very integrity of our culture that we preserve the integrity of our artworks." Id.
One effort to further this opinion occurred in 1991 at Seattle's "In Public"
project. Douglas McLennan, A Banner Day for In Public, SEATTLE WEEKLY,
Aug. 21, 1991 at 45-48. The Seattle Art Museum and the Seattle Art
Commission offered a vision of public art. Id. International artists were invited
to Seattle to discuss information and ideas addressing the events, experiences
and senses that shape our existence. Id. Artists chose the sites they wished to
display work on. Id.
However, there is an historic pattern of governments dictating artistic values. If
a country's leaders are "materialistic and nihilistic, then artist with those
characteristics will gain fame and riches." Don Gray, "The Artist's Life,"
The
available at http://www.jessievans-dongray.com/essays/essayO08.html.
reasoning is that when artists challenge the societal norms and power structures,
the potential for civic unrest generates censorship of such works. Often, "living
artists are a threat to the aesthetic, psychological and financial status quo." Id.
(stating also that "most of humanity is at least a generation behind the greatest
artists.") As applied to this comment, a preservation district's aesthetic status
quo and an artist's challenging work demonstrates an historic shoving match.
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example, in an area seeking to attract tourists, historic preservation
ordinances aim to increase tourism by preserving some unique
aesthetic and historical appeal.46 Aesthetic uniformity becomes
important to a small town relying on tourist dollars to keep shops
open and the economy stimulated.4 7 Aesthetic uniformity and
public works of art are combatants in this regard.
If a
controversial public work is created, many municipalities worry
that its content will adversely affect tourism.48
The question of whether historic preservation ordinances may be
a governmental guise for censorship of the arts is the central focus

46. See Angela C. Carmella, Landmark Preservationof Church Property, 34
41, 42 (1991) (noting a common goal for historic district designation
is to increase tourism revenue).
47. Id.
48. Melissa Burger, Mural Art in Flagstaff42-45 (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Northern Ariz. Univ. 2001) (copy on file at Cline Library, Northern Ariz.
University). This is precisely what happened in Flagstaff, Arizona. A group of
Native American youths painted a large mural on the side of a downtown store.
Id. The mural was essentially divided into two parts, both focusing on a NativeAmerican perspective and reflecting themes such as alcoholism and bondage.
Id. The bottom of the mural contained brown hands handcuffed to liquor bottles,
blood running and skeletal remains, while the top of the mural showed an eagle,
an American flag and a mountain backdrop. Id. The mural was readily visible
to any pedestrian or car driving past that intersection. Id. Many complaints
came in the local newspaper, the Arizona Daily Sun, quickly after the mural
went up. Stephanie Innes, Mural Design Divides Downtown, ARIz. DAILY SUN,
July 9, 1994, at A2. One prominent citizen and local author commented, "1 was
so disappointed. It doesn't portray anything about Flagstaff... it doesn't fit
into my idea of history of the city." Id. A local merchant stated that, "I know
it's cathartic and it's good for the kids. It's just inappropriate there." Id.
The Flagstaff dispute also highlights the argument that some artwork adversely
effects tourism. Today, the youth mural remains unaltered and has become a
fixture of downtown Flagstaff.
Similarly, consider the undertaking at a small community college in New York
in 1991.
Hoffman, supra note 20, at 96. School officials removed a
photographer's exhibit because a member of a religious order had complained
that nude figures therein offended her. Id. Upon the artist's First Amendment
suit, the school agreed to place the exhibit in the main library, to publicize the
exhibit, host a reception and pay the artist $300. Id. See also ACLU ARTS
CENSORSHIP PROJECT NEWSLETTER, Spring 1992 at 4.
CATHLAw
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of this comment, which could highlight some legal forewarning in

preservation cases.49
IV.

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED EXPRESSION AND
RESTRICTIVE PRESERVATION ORDINANCES

While there is no doubt historic preservation is a legitimate
public interest," this section focuses on an artist's Constitutional
rights and whether historic preservation ordinances survive
Constitutional challenges.
An open question exists whether
America's limited moral rights protections afford an artist a
Constitutionally cognizable injury granting an artist a cause of
action if the work is removed, altered, or destroyed. In Burke v.
City of Charleston5 1 the court was confronted with the difficulty of
balancing historic preservation interests and artists' interests.

49. Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 573 (9 th Cir. 1984)
(requiring decisions to be carefully scrutinized when made by a political body).
The holding illustrates the decisions of historic preservation enforcement
commissions and is a warning of potentially poor decisions.
50. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (holding public welfare
encompasses aesthetics); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (recognizing that it is "well settled that a state may
legitimately exercise its police powers to advance aesthetic values"); Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978)
(holding historic preservation ordinance was an "appropriate means" to securing
"an entirely permissible governmental goal"); and Richard J. Roddewig,
Preparinga Historic Preservation Ordinance, SG040 ALI-ABA 365, 367-70
(2001). The "historic preservation ordinance has evolved as a legitimate
governmental tool for the protection of individual landmarks and entire historic
neighborhoods." Id. at 367.
Some states put historic preservation provisions in the state Constitution itself.
Id. (citing the Madison, Wisconsin preservation ordinance states its purpose, in
pertinent part, was to "accomplish the protection, enhancement, and
perpetuation of such improvements and of districts that represent or reflect
elements of the city's cultural, social, economic, political, and architectural
history").
51. 139 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 1998).
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FirstAmendment Challenges to Historic Preservation
Ordinances

To some extent, historic preservation ordinances necessarily
impede some forms of speech and expression. 2 However, a
preservation ordinance, while promoting aesthetic uniformity, will
be struck down if the court finds that the legislation is "contentbased, vague or overbroad, even if the municipal interests are
valid."53

A variety of arguments emerge relating to First Amendment
First, preservation
challenges to preservation ordinances.
5
ordinances have been attacked for being vague. 4 The rationale for
52. Randall J. Cude, Note and Comment: Beauty and Well-Drawn
Ordinance: Avoiding Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenges to Municipal
Aesthetic Regulations, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 853, 855 (1998) (discussing aesthetic
regulations generally, including regulations affecting installation of newsracks,
parades, street sales of artist works, signs and billboards, and murals).
53. Id. at 863. In addition to First Amendment challenges, the initial concern
for a plaintiff in a preservation challenge is due process. Id. at 910. Due
process protections prevent citizens from "arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement" of an ordinance or law. Id. at 876. In essence, due process simply
mandates laws be fairly implemented and applied.
Among the safeguards provided by due process is the opportunity to be heard.
The opponent of the law must be given the opportunity to speak at a hearing
where all interested parties are given a bona fide opportunity to present their
arguments. Id. at 910. This requirement begs the question who is an interested
party regarding enforcement decisions in preservation challenges?
The U.S. Supreme Court has said enforcement commission decisions "are
necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must be
carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only public rationalization of an
impermissible purpose." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
510 (1981). Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court realized long ago that enforcement
commission hearings and determinations must be closely monitored to ensure
neutrality.
The argument that preservation enforcement commissions cannot remain neutral
generally fails because the specialized backgrounds of commission members
actually help ensure fair decision making. However, this argument takes for
granted the interests and preferences of those commission members, regardless
of their specialized backgrounds.
54. Cude, supra note 52, at 859.
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avoiding vaguely worded laws is that "[a]n unclear law, a law that
does not draw bright lines, might regulate, or appear to regulate,
more than is necessary, and thus deter or chill persons from
engaging in protected speech."55
It is important that the preservation ordinance not hinder
constitutionally protected speech. If the preservation ordinance
contains "either confusing enforcement standards for municipal
officials or imprecise requirements for permissible communicative
expression"56 it will be deemed invalid. Therefore, it is critical that
the ordinance outline specific standards and give the public notice
of what activities, renovations, designs and aesthetic patterns will
be acceptable. 7
Second, the overbreadth doctrine will strike down a law that
functions to quash a person's protected speech. 8 In the context of
historic preservation and other aesthetic ordinances, the ordinance
is vulnerable if "[u]nclear procedures can lead city officials to
impermissibly exercise enforcement discretion that over-censors
otherwise protected First Amendment activities" 59 such as artistic
expression.
The overbreadth challenge to a preservation ordinance includes
a determination of the level of scrutiny to be applied.6" If
an
ordinance discriminates against a protected class of citizens, the
court will strictly examine the ordinance. 6' However, if the
ordinance provides only content-neutral
provisions, an
62
intermediate level of scrutiny will be applied. The municipalities
enforcing preservation ordinances must show, if the court does not
find content-neutrality, that the ordinance is narrowly drawn to
55.

JOHN.

E.

NOWAK

&

RONALD

D.

ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1001

(5th ed. 1995).
56. Cude, supra note 52, at 867.

57. Id. at 899, 900. The danger of unspecified standards from the point of
view of the municipality is that "[i]nexplicit standards in a licensing ordinance
may be challenged facially without first applying for the license." Id.
58. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 55, at 996.
59. Cude, supra note 52, at 870.
60. Id. at 871.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 872.
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achieve the goals of the ordinance.63 In the context of public art,
the municipality desiring to remove a work must show the
ordinance is appropriately drafted and does not hinder
constitutionally protected speech. 4
Appropriate preservation
ordinance drafting includes ensuring neutral enforcement
commission decisions. Neutral enforcement commission decisions
are critical to the interests of both the municipality and the artist
because the municipality will produce a legitimate and narrowly
tailored preservation ordinance and the artist will avoid subjective
evaluation of her work's artistic merit.
Thus, a municipality must be careful to preserve not only its
historic district but also individual Constitutional rights. An
ordinance that lacks specific standards for considering permit
applications or that violates due process rights will not be upheld.65
In addition to First Amendment challenges, the moral rights of the
artist after the sale of the work may afford the artist additional
protections if a work is destroyed, removed or altered.
B.

The Role of Moral Rights in the Conflict Between Historic
Preservationand Artistic Expression.

Whether federal moral rights legislation creates a
constitutionally cognizable injury granting artists standing to sue
in preservation challenges is still an open question. Examination
of the moral rights legislation and scholarly comment provide
some insight.
Moral rights "permit the author of a work to protect it even after
the work has been sold to another."66 The protected moral rights

63. Id. at 875.
64. Id.
65. Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 907 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding a law is
impermissibly void for vagueness if the law "contains terms so vague that
persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application") (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
629 (1984) (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926))).
66. Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A Property-Law
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under VARA are the rights of integrity and attribution.67 The right
of integrity prevents "the distortion, mutilation, modification or
destruction of a work of visual art."68 The right of attribution
simply requires the artist is properly credited as creator of the
work. Congress sought to protect moral rights because it believed
American culture could only benefit from encouraging artists to
produce works of art.69 The purpose behind federal, state, and
local preservation laws is also to benefit American culture.7" The
challenge to the legal community begins when these two interests,
sharing a similar purpose, are pitted against one another.
Moral rights questions may arise in cases where artists challenge
historic preservation ordinances. Does VARA's right of integrity
prevent the preservation enforcement commission from altering a
work after it goes up? 7 When these competing interests begin to
Frameworkfor the Protection of Authors' Moral Rights, 69 TUL. L. REV. 935,
937 (1995).
67. Marko Iglendza, Moral Rights Protection Under the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990: The Judicial Interpretation in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 5
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 187, 187 (1995) (citing VARA, 17 U.S.C. §
106A(a)(1) and (2)(1990)). The right of attribution provides the artist a right to
claim authorship of a work "to prevent his or her name from being attached to a
work which he or she did not create, and to prevent his or her name from being
attached to a work that has been altered." Id.
68. Id.
69. H.R. Rep. No. 513, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990). See also "Visual
Artists Right Act, History Preceding VARA and Explanded Protections
Available
Under
State
Laws,"
available
at
http://arts.endow.gov/artforms/Manage/VARA2.html
(last visited March 5,
2003) (discussing pre-VARA state moral rights legislation and outlining the
rationale for the subsequent passage of VARA).
70. See Layperson, supra note 5 and accompanying text (government's role
in preservation).
71. This assumes the other requirements of VARA have been met. Jill R.
Applebaum, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: An Analysis Based on the
French Droit Moral, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191, 202-03 (1992) (noting
VARA protects only "works of visual art.") "Works of visual art" under VARA
are limited. Id. For example, VARA protections are only afforded to works of
"recognized stature." Iglendza, supra note 67 at 206-07. However, "recognized
stature" is not defined in VARA. Id. at 206. This elusive concept was
addressed in Carter v. Helmsley-Spearjnc., 861 F.Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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collide, what weight should the courts give to preservation and
moral rights, respectively? These are some issues raised when
artistic freedom and preservation ordinances conflict.
Additionally, through VARA Congress has shown an intent to
recognize more abstract injury concerning artists. Congress
solidified this intent by including a provision in VARA stating,
"[o]nly the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred
by [VARA] in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright
owner."72 VARA recognizes the abstract injury to the artists'
career and reputation to an extent as well as injury to a work itself.
Of course, this abstract injury flies in the face of traditional
American notions of property and commerce. It is difficult to
convince American lawmakers, for example, that the sale of a
painting to someone will not guarantee that the person can do with
the painting whatever she desires without regard to the artist.
Moral rights granted by VARA indicate a congressional desire
to recognize a non-traditional injury to an artist by way of
destruction, alteration, or removal of a work. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that artists have a constitutionally
cognizable injury granting them standing to sue when their works
are altered, removed or destroyed without their consent. However,
this approach to moral rights does not always play itself out when
The court held an artist could satisfy the "recognized stature" requirement in
VARA by first showing "stature," such as being "viewed as meritorious" art.
Carter, 861 F.Supp. 303 at 325. The artist must also show the work is
recognized "by experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some
cross-section of society." Id.
VARA also will not extend protection to a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. §
101A (2000). The factors to be used in determining whether a work was made
for hire include: (1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of
creation; (2) the level of skill required; (3) the provision of benefits to the hired
party; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party. Carter, 861 F.Supp.
at 317. In addition, "[i]ndependent contractors are typically hired only for
particular projects," and those hired to perform various jobs at the will of the
hiring party are more likely to be deemed an employee. Id. at 319 (quoting
Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 863 (1992)).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b)(2000).
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courts are asked to adjudicate these matters.
C. A Case Involving Public Art and Historic Preservation
The Burke73 decision illustrates the conflict between artists'
rights and historic preservation ordinances to a limited degree. In
that case, an artist's mural was ordered removed from the side of a
Charleston nightclub for failure to comply with the city's historic
preservation permit procedure and aesthetic uniformity.74 The
artist brought suit claiming the Board of Architectural Review's
("BAR") decision to remove his mural violated his free speech and
equal protections rights.75 The artist also claimed that the
preservation ordinance had no uniform standards for approving
work, thereby rendering it unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.76 The artist's attorney did not bring a VARA claim.
The trial court upheld the ordinance, claiming the artist failed to
prove his constitutional claims.77 On appeal, the artist abandoned
his equal protection claim and only appealed concerning the First
Amendment issues of vagueness and overbreadth. 8 The appellate
court did not even reach the artist's First Amendment analysis,
however, holding the artist had no standing to sue in the first
place.79 The artist's lack of standing, according to the appellate
court, was the result of Burke relinquishing any rights in the mural
upon the sale of it to the nightclub owner.8" In the court's view,
the sale of the mural eliminated any injury the artist might have. 8
73.
74.
75.
76.

139 F.3d401 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.

77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 406.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court, misunderstanding the life and career of a professional
artist, said, "we fail to discern how the operation of the ordinance in respect to
Burke's right to artistic expression amounts to a concrete injury, rather than
mere tangential effect, at best." Id. See also supra note 67 and accompanying
text (discussing moral rights protection).
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Furthermore, it was held the artist did not demonstrate
82
redressability.
Burke's attempt to reconcile the competing interests of the artist
and the city produced some curious legal reasoning. That case's
suspect reasoning warrants closer analysis to clearly illustrate the
conflict involved.
1.

Historic PreservationEnforcement Board

Charleston's BAR is the political body entrusted with the
responsibility of applying the preservation ordinance.83 When the
artist's mural was completed without application to the
preservation enforcement commission to alter a building within the
preservation district, public controversy began due to the colorful
image, which clearly contrasted the traditional aesthetic themes of
Charleston.84 Both prior to and at the public hearing for a permit,85
residents of Charleston voiced both support and disgust for the
mural.86 The BAR ultimately found the mural unacceptable,
82. 139 F.3d at 406. The court held that even if the historic preservation
ordinance was deemed unconstitutional as the artist urged, that result would do
nothing to prevent a subsequent owner of the nightclub from simply painting
over the mural. Id. at 407.
83. Id. at 403.
84. Id. at 404.
85. Although the artist did not initially apply for a permit, he did so once the
BAR brought that fact to his attention. Id. at 403.
86. The BAR received letters from area resident before the hearing. Burke v.
City of Charleston, 893 F.Supp. 589, 595 (D.S.C. 1995). One letter stated:
I hope that the [BAR] will use its good taste... and refuse to grant a permit to
that ugly, controversial mural on King Street that is sophomoric and offensive.
A child could have done a more pleasant and artistic mural than this one. Please
do not ruin our downtown by allowing this tasteless work to stay...
Id. (quotations omitted). See also supra note 53 (discussing public disapproval
of public art and injecting inappropriate considerations into enforcement
commission determinations).
The artist in Burke called an expert witness who was Dean of the School of Arts
at the University of Charleston. 893 F.Supp. at 601-2. The witness testified at
trial that "[h]e found plaintiff's mural to be an important work of art, and stated
that he could not distinguish between approved and unapproved murals under
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claiming that its findings were content-neutral.87
It is well settled that a preservation enforcement commission
such as Charleston's BAR must make determinations in a contentneutral manner.88 The concern from the point of view of the artist
is "whether an enforcement official may act in a way that creates
impermissible censorship of expression through the arbitrary
denial of a permit."89 An enforcement commission may proclaim
content-neutrality while acting in a subjective way. If subjective
decisions are made, the enforcement commission runs the risk of
censorship based on personal or community taste in art. At least
the possibility of subjective artistic value judgment was certainly
present when Charleston's BAR considered Burke's mural.
The public outcry centered upon disapproval of the image itself.
Many members of the community did not find that the mural
mirrored their own ideas of what art should be.9" However, a local
art expert was asked to give the BAR an opinion of the mural, and
he voiced his approval of it.9 Thus, the BAR found itself in the
awkward position of being inundated with community cries for
removal, and support for the mural from art professionals. In the
face of these subjective views, the BAR remained legally restricted
to content-neutrality.
the ordinances." Id. at 602. Whereas the trial court did not contest the
testimony of the City's witnesses, it focused particular scrutiny on the artist's
expert, discounting his testimony. Id.
In addition, Charleston's Mayor was allowed to testify at the permit hearing. Id.
at 597.
The trial court accepted as credible the Mayor's blanket and
unsupported assertion that "if this mural were allowed to be displayed in the
heart of the Old and Historic District, the special nature of that area would be
lost, resulting in adverse economic affects." Id. The court did not seek expert
economic testimony but instead took the Mayor's assertion as fact. Id.
87. Id. at 601. One BAR member gave testimony at trail regarding the
criteria he uses in applying historic preservation ordinances to proposed
structures. Id. The BAR member said he "reviews the proposed structure's
size, shape, general configuration and color to determine its harmony with the
surrounding area and conformity with the historic preservation laws." Id.
88. Cude, supra note 52, at 899.
89. Id.
90. Burke, 139 F.3d at 404.
91. Burke v. City of Charleston, 839 F.Supp. 589, 596-97 (D.S.C. 1995).
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The position in which the BAR found itself is indicative of a
major problem with applying preservation ordinances to public art.
How can an enforcement official remain neutral in an emotionally
charged debate essentially disputing what meritorious art should
look like?92 The standards adopted in the preservation ordinance
should be the sole guidelines adhered to by preservation
enforcements boards.93
2.

Adoption ofAesthetic Standards to Ensure Content Neutrality

Courts require that aesthetic regulations clearly identify the
standards on which they rely, thereby limiting the enforcement
official's discretion.94 As illustrated by Burke, it is important to
severely limit the discretion of enforcement officials in order to
maintain content-neutrality. The BAR in Charleston had not, in
over sixty years of existence, adopted even one aesthetic standard
that would give an artist forewarning of what would and would not
be acceptable public art. 95 However, the majority, as Chief Justice
Wilkinson pointed out in his strong dissent, found no standing
without consideration of the novel competing public interests
involved. 96 The issue of whether due process rights were violated
by way of the total lack of standards did not come up on appeal. 97
Standards are the essential protective barrier between arbitrary
censorship of constitutionally protected speech and appropriate
enforcement of preservation ordinances.
Specific standards
adopted to give enforcement commissions some jumping off point
help to limit the commissions' discretion in application reviews,
92. Cude, supra, note 52, at 913 n. 182 (stating that "[t]he concern is that
without these licensing standards, officials will later engage in rationalizations
and arbitrary criteria for permit approval.").
93. See generally id. at 899.
94. Id. at 899 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S.
750, 757 (1988)).
95. Burke, 893 F.Supp. at 611-12.
96. Burke, 139 F.3d at 408. The dissent argued that "[t]hose arguments
deserve[d] to be addressed by this court just as they were by the district court."
Id.
97. Id.
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which in turn alleviates claims of unlawful subjective decision
making. Courts pay particular attention to "legislation that acts as
an inexplicit guideline that delegates policy matters to police,
licensing officials, judges or juries for subjective resolution."98
Leaving such determinations in the hands of those ill-equipped to
make such determinations again beckons the underlying principle
of Justice Holmes's warning that "[i]t would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of [art], outside the narrowest and most
obvious limits."99 While enforcement commission members are
not trained only in the law, Holmes's ageless warning points to the
principle that determinations involving art should adhere to
objective standards as closely as possible. Having no specific
standards in place from the outset enables enforcement
commissions to proclaim content neutrality while essentially
making subjective determinations based on artistic preference.
3.

The Artist's Standing to Sue

Although the Burke court did not find standing, the question of
whether the artist indeed did have a constitutionally cognizable
injury requires a more subtle analysis than the court was willing to
conduct.
First, the Burke court found the artist lacked the requisite injuryIt claimed that since the artist sold
in-fact to pursue the lawsuit.'
only the nightclub owner was
owner,
his mural to the nightclub
injured by the removal of the mural."' The U.S. Supreme Court
has attempted to guide the legal community through the difficult
injury-in-fact requirement. Injury-in-fact is "an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
98. Cude, supra note 52, at 900.
99. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 300 (1903).
100. Burke, 139 F.3d at 405 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975) and holding that "a plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties").
101. Burke, 139 F.3d at 406.
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particularized,... and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."" 2 While it is beyond dispute that moral rights
protections are abstract, those protections are hardly conjectural or
hypothetical as evidenced by the congressional recognition of
limited moral rights in VARA. In the case of a professional artist,
whether a concrete and particular injury occurs even after sale of a
work is a critical question.
The professional artist must establish a reputation in order to
generate sufficient income.0 3 The injury-in-fact to the artist whose
work is removed from visibility is more concrete and imminent
than other cases where the Supreme Court found sufficient injuryin-fact.0 4 The key consideration is whether the plaintiff alleges to
102. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
103. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 27, at 592, 619. The professional
artist "[has] two irreducible needs: to have their art shown and sufficient means
with which to live and create." Id. at 619. The critical ingredient to success for
the professional artist is that her works be displayed for others. Thus, any
significant hindrance upon the artist's ability to display works, both publicly or
privately, is an injury to the artist's career.
104. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) (Law students challenged
raised freight costs, claiming the rate hike discouraged the use of recycled
goods.) The Court found plaintiffs' allegation that reduced recycling rates
equate to more natural resource consumption, which in turn hindered plaintiffs'
right to enjoy the forests, streams, and mountains in Washington D.C. was
sufficient injury so long as plaintiffs' suffered the harm personally. Id. See also
Clinton v. New York City, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding a change in market
conditions was sufficient injury for standing purposes); Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 168 (1007) (holding that possible reduction in water supply as a result
of the Endangered Species Act was sufficient injury for standing purposes); Int'l
Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72
(1991) (holding the loss of the right to sue in the forum of plaintiff's choice is
an injury creating standing), Asarco v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (holding a
state court's decision is capable of creating injury for standing purposes). But
see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (refusing to allow standing to plaintiff
claiming tax exemptions to private schools that discriminated on the basis of
race were unconstitutional); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (refusing to
hear a challenge to abortion laws by a married couple claiming injury to
"marital happiness" was harmed).
In addition to injury, the plaintiff must show the injury is "fairly traceable to the
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suffer the injury personally. 1°5 The artist in Burke had a piece of
art destroyed by the enforcement commission. His work was no
longer viewable by the public and could not be shared with
audiences in coming years. There is little doubt that such
destruction in some way affects the artist's reputation and deprives
society of the pleasure to view the work in the future. The dissent
in Burke opined that the majority found no standing in order to
dodge the complexity involved in balancing these competing
interests."°6
Although the artist brought no VARA claim, moral rights
complicate the matter in Burke. Does VARA's right of integrity
prevent preservation enforcement commissions from altering a
work after its production? The Burke court's finding of no
standing flies in the face of VARA. The Congressional grant of
some moral rights in VARA appears to directly conflict with the
court's finding that the artist suffered no injury. The court did not
consider the VARA legislation, and there is no record of either
party asserting a VARA claim." 7
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief" Allen, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). See also United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, (1995) (holding causation and redressability are
constitutional requirements for standing); Northeastern Florida Chapter of
Assoc. Gen. Contractors or America v. Jacksonville, Florida, 508 U.S. 656, 663
(1993) (holding causation and redressability are separate inquiries and must
both be met for federal courts to hear the case); and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 505 (1975) (holding plaintiff must show the injury "was the consequence
of the defendants' actions, or that the prospective relief will remove the harm.").
Of course, the artist claiming injury to destruction or alteration of a work could
show the conduct of the preservation commission in breaching her moral rights
caused the injury and a court order stopping such breach would redress the
breach.
105. Overview, supra note 13, at 107. The Constitution "requires that
plaintiffs allege injury to an interest personal to them" in order to satisfy
standing requirements. Id.
106. Burke, 139 F.3d 401 at 408. The dissent said the arguments of both
sides "deserve(d) to be addressed by this court just as they were by the district
court." Id.
107. Burke, 139 F.3d 408. See also 17 U.S.C. § 113 (2000). This section of
VARA dictates procedures for a building owner to follow if they wish to
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V. INJURY TO AN ARTIST'S MORAL RIGHTS, ENFORCEMENT
COMMISSION STANDARDS AND PERMIT REVIEW HEARINGS

VARA and America's limited moral rights protections grant
artists a constitutionally cognizable injury when their works are
altered, moved or destroyed. New guidelines for preservation
enforcement commissions must be installed when considering
whether to remove, alter or destroy a work. This section suggests
that due process and public hearings for the artist be restricted to
relevant and objective parties to better ensure a content-neutral
decision of the enforcement commission.
Finally, additional
considerations that preservation enforcement commissions should
employ when determining whether to grant a permit to an artist
must be examined.
A.

VARA GrantsArtists a Constitutionally Cognizable Injury and
Standing to Sue in PreservationDisputes.

The appellate court's decision in Burke, denying the artist an
appeal because the bar owner who purchased the work alone
suffered injury, is a misreading of the law.' 8 In fact, VARA
carries a completely different spirit and is controlling law. If a
VARA claim had been made, the correct view under VARA is that
"title to the soul of an artwork does not pass with the sale of the
artwork itself."'0 9 The rights granted by VARA clearly show the
intent of Congress to protect the reputation of the artist and the
work itself."0

destroy, alter or remove a work. Id. The statute provides that if a building
owner wishes to remove a work, permission of the artist must be obtained first.
Id. This seems to directly contradict the decision discussed since VARA
explicitly grants artists a continued (albeit limited) interest in their works even
after sale. Supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing American moral
rights protection).
108. 136 CONG. REC. H3111-02 at H3113 (statement of Rep. Fish).
109. INGLENDZA, supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the
purpose and effect of American moral rights protection).
110. Novak and Rotunda, supra note 55, at 76.
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The constitutional requirement that a party allege a personal
stake is the foundation of the injury analysis.11 ' The artist in a
preservation ordinance challenge must show a "distinct and
palpable injury.""' 2 Congress, through VARA, has recognized the
reputation of the artist and the maintenance of a work of art as

legitimate interests triggering a constitutionally cognizable injury.
It was said that "congressional intervention was the most
appropriate and most effective way to accomplish the goals of
protecting works of visual art and the honor and reputations of
those who create them."" 3 Thus, Congress specifically intended to
grant artists of qualifying visual works the right to claim a personal
stake in matters such as an enforcement commission's ordered
14
removal of a work.
The act of selling the work to a third party does not erase the
artist's continuing personality interest in the work under VARA.
Congress provided support for the continuing interest of the artist
during the VARA debates." 5 Therefore, in disputes such as Burke,
courts should not assume that the sale of a work forfeits the artist's
continuing moral rights protections.
A narrow analysis of injury guided by the principle that only the
actual owner of the art is harmed by its removal, alteration or
111. Id.
112. 136 CONG. REC. H31 11 at H3113 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
113. Note that the second requirement of the artist in a preservation dispute
to show sufficient injury is to show a "fairly traceable casual connection
between the claimed injury and the conduct that plaintiff challenges." NOVAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 55, at 76. This does not present a problem for the artist
challenging a preservation enforcement commission decision since the
commission's conduct is directly traceable to the injury suffered by the artist.
114. 136 CONG. REC. H31 11 at H3114. Representative Markey discussed
one rationale for the avoidance of a strict property analysis pertaining to works
of art. Id. He told the tale of two entrepreneurs who bought a Picasso and cut it
into 500 pieces, selling each individual piece for $135 apiece. Id. After
successful sales, one of the entrepreneurs stated "if this thing takes off, we may
buy other masters as well and give them the chop." Id. Markey continued, "[a]
work of art is not a utilitarian object like a toaster. It is an intellectual work ...
[w]e must not permit the connection between the artist and his or her work to be
severed the first time the work is sold." Id.
115. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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destruction is incorrect under VARA. The spirit embodied by
VARA and moral rights protections generally require courts to
move away from traditional economic and property dogma and
toward being the ultimate guardian of cultural contributors." 6
Modem adjudication of preservation disputes involving artists
must consider not only the purpose of preservation ordinances but
also that "visual art plays an important role in our cultural life, and
that artists who have put their hearts and souls into their creations
deserve protection for their efforts.""' 7 Though this injury is
somewhat abstract when compared to the more easily accessible
purpose of historic preservation, courts must not treat a work of art
"simply as a physical piece of property, rather than as an
intellectual work[.]""' 8 The limited view of art as mere property
too narrowly defines injury for purposes of standing to sue under
moral rights laws. After all, "[s]ociety is the ultimate loser when
these works are modified or destroyed. They should be preserved
in the way the artist intended[.]""' 9 VARA grants artists in
preservation disputes a constitutionally cognizable injury and
therefore an artist does have standing to sue. 12 In addition to an
artist's ability to satisfy standing requirements, the artist has a
difficult barrier once preservation enforcement commissions judge
their applications for display.

116. Id. at H3 114 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
117. Id.
118. Id. at H3113 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
119. Notice also that Congressional debate of VARA included various
members of the House of Representatives using the term 'preserve' when
discussing the purpose of the Act. Id. at H3 113. For example, it was said that
works of visual art "should be preserved in the way the artist intended, and as
the important part of our cultural heritage that they are." Id. When one
considers the purpose of historic preservation, namely, to preserve buildings and
properties of cultural heritage and significance, the competing interests become
even more entangled due to a common goal.
120. Cude, supra note 52, at 866.
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Enforcement Commission Standardsand Hearings

Enforcement Commission Review Standards

An artist should be particularly concerned with the clarity with
which a preservation ordinance communicates aesthetic standards.
An ordinance lacking specific standards "implicates a vagueness
challenge." ' 21 Unfortunately, many preservation ordinances do not

specify precise standards, and instead risk the appearance of
"impermissible censorship of expression through the arbitrary
denial of a permit." 22 The typical preservation ordinance merely
121. Id. at 899.
122. For example, the City of Tavares, Florida's preservation ordinance
provides:
Visual compatibility will be defined in terms of the following criteria:
(1) Front Facade Proportion. The front facade of each building or
structure will be visually
compatible with and in direct relationship to the width of the building
and to the height of the
front elevation of other adjacent or adjoining buildings within an historic
district...
(3). Rhythm of Solids To Voids in Front Facades. The relationship of
solids to voids in the front
facade of a building or structure will be visually compatible with the
front facades of historic
sites within the historic district.
(4). Relationship of Materials, Texture and Color. The relationship of
materials, texture and color
of the facade of a building will be visually compatible with the
predominant materials used in
the historic sites within the historic district ...

§ 9-21(0(2001). The
Tavares ordinance is indicative of the problems involved in drafting a
preservation ordinance. If the municipality drafts specific standards to be used
by its enforcement commission, it may not give the commission enough leeway
to carry out the purpose of preservation.
The City of Phoenix also provides only broad standards of review in
TAVARES, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 9, Art. III,

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss2/3

32

Binetti: Culture Club or The Clash? Historic Preservation, Aesthetic Unifo

2003]

CULTURE CLUB OR THE CLASH

345

recites broad guidelines of review, affording enforcement
commissions a great deal of latitude. The specificity of aesthetic
standards employed by an enforcement commission should be
written into the ordinance itself, functioning as "limitations on the
enforcement officials to approve or disapprove the regulated
expression.

' 123

For example, the Fredericksburg, Texas preservation ordinance
is a model of an appropriately drafted ordinance and contains the
specificity needed to avoid vagueness challenges.
The
Fredericksburg standards for application review provides:
C.

Paint

Color.

Traditionally,

the

base

color

of

preservation enforcement proceedings. The Phoenix ordinance provides:
D. Standards for Consideration of a Certificate of Appropriateness:
a. The proposed work will be compatible with the relevant historic, cultural,
educational or architectural qualities characteristic of the structure, site or
district and shall include but not be limited to elements of size, scale, massing,
proportions, orientation, surface textures and patterns, details and
embellishments and the relation of these elements to one another.
PHOENIX, ARIZ. CITY CODE, ch. 8 § 812 (2002).
Available at http://www.ci.phoenix.az.us/HISTORIC/histord4.html#HIST812
(last visited November 19, 2002).
Similarly, Philadelphia's preservation ordinance contains particularly vague
standards. Philadelphia's ordinance provides these standards for application
review:
(. l)the purpose of this section;

(.2)the historical, architectural or aesthetic significance of the building,
structure, site or object ...

(.4)the compatibility of the proposed work with the character of the
historic district or with the character of its site, including the effect of the
proposed work on the neighboring structures, the surroundings and the
streetscape; and,
(.5)the design of the proposed work.
Philadelphia, PA. CITY CODE & HOME RULE CHARTER § 142007(k)(2002).
Available at http://sprucehill.uchs.net/ordinance.htm
(last visited November 19, 2002).
This wide latitude means that virtually any alteration or creation within
Philadelphia's historic district may be denied. Artists, then, are left guessing
whether their works will be acceptable.
123. Cude, supra note 52, at 909.
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Fredericksburg's buildings have been soft muted shades of
greens, blues, whites, and tans. In order to continue the
historic integrity of the buildings in the district, these colors
continue to be acceptable today, and do not require review or
issuance of a certificate. Base colors such as vibrant or "hot"
shades, dark deep shades, and black shades are not
acceptable. If one wishes to use these colors a Certificate of
Appropriateness must be granted. The painting of existing
historic buildings composed of materials such as unpainted
stone or unpainted masonry is prohibited.'24
The Fredericksburg ordinance clearly describes aesthetic
standards for the historic district. An artist seeking to create a
work within the district is on notice of what colors may be used
and what colors will present issues for the enforcement
commission during the application review process.
Enforcement commissions should develop specific aesthetic
standards over time. As the preservation ordinance endures,
aesthetic themes will develop in the community. The ordinance
should be redrafted to further specify the colors and designs that
have developed.' 25 Where the preservation ordinance lacks any
standards and grants the enforcement commission extremely broad
powers, that ordinance becomes a governmental guise for
censorship of the arts.
Adopting standards not only better serves the municipality but
also better serves outside parties such as artists by giving them
ample notice of what the enforcement commission will consider
during review procedures. Thus, municipalities must work to
124. FREDERICKSBURG, TX. ORDINANCES ch. 12, § 12.208 (2002).
125. In Burke, the Charleston ordinance existed for over sixty years at the
time of the artist's application. 839 F.Supp. 589, 597 (D.S.C. 1995). The
inability or unwillingness of Charleston's enforcement commission to adopt
standards giving an artist or other parties notice of the aesthetic themes of the
city is an inappropriate approach to application review procedures. See supra
note 98 and accompanying text
(discussing the BAR's lack of specific standards even after sixty years of
preservation ordinance enforcement).
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reduce the amount of discretion given to enforcement commissions
in order to better ensure objective determinations. The longer the
ordinance exists, the better equipped the municipality will be to
adopt specific standards.
2.

PreservationChallenges and Public Hearings

Members of the public speaking at a preservation enforcement
commission appeal hearing should not be permitted to influence
the commission's decision by injecting subjective artistic value
judgment into what should be a content neutral decision making
procedure. 126 In Burke, citizens from the community were allowed
to inject artistic preferences and personal opinion of the artist's
work.'27 Injecting such testimony into a review proceeding does
little to support a municipality's claim of content neutrality. While
the purpose of a public hearing is to allow the community to speak
to its officials, enforcement commissions must take measures to
avoid being influenced by mere artistic opinion.128 An open
126. The public hearing is a "give and take of ideas among interested
parties." Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in
Making Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 293, 319 (20012002). However, when the issue of art is presented, the general public's ability
to pose as an interested party and inject subjective opinion based merely upon
artistic preference is a grave risk. After all, the enforcement commissions are
appointed and live in the community, and will be pressured by the vocal
opposition to make a subjective determination. The enforcement commission
members, who live in the community and are entrusted with carrying out the
will of the community on preservation matters, will adequately represent most
of the general public's interest in virtually every instance by reason of their
duties. The "ability to float compromise proposals, the imposition of specific
mitigation measures.., and the concentration of public concerns in the one
specific forum" can be preserved while eliminating irrelevant and inappropriate
testimony from the hearing. Id.
127. Burke, 893 F.Supp. at 595. See supra note 89.
128. There are additional considerations that an enforcement commission
should consider in some disputes involving artists. First, the level of scrutiny
given to an artwork should be determined on a sliding scale. That is, the
enforcement commission should first narrow its investigation by determining
the degree to which the work interferes with preservation aesthetics. The
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meeting allowing such artistic opinion could be a lethal injection
to the artist.
VI. CONCLUSION

When publicly displayed artwork is placed inside or near a
historic preservation district, competing interests arise.
The
artist's constitutionally protected expression and the legitimate
governmental interest of preserving properties and structures of
cultural significance collide with an empty middle ground. Both
play an important role in preserving American culture and
solidifying our sense of place and time.

When historic preservation ordinances are drafted and enforced,
totality of the circumstances should be accounted for, focusing on whether a
reasonable person would view the work as disruptive to the aesthetic themes of
the area. For example, if a work is merely viewable from, and not situated in,
the preservation district, the commission should not review a permit application
as rigidly as it would a work placed directly inside the preservation district.
Admittedly, this proposal asks courts and preservation commissions to apply
subjective considerations, but the subject matter is by definition unique and
deserves more subtle analysis.
This approach makes sense because of the balancing of interests in such a
situation. Enforcement commission decisions should include consideration of
where the artwork actually is placed. Enforcement commission should not have
broad authority to dictate the aesthetics of areas outside the preservation district
merely because a work is viewable from that district. Another example is if the
art is located on the outskirts of the district or in an area such as an alley behind
preserved buildings.
Second, even if artwork is situated directly inside a preservation district, the
precise location of the work should be taken into consideration by the
enforcement commission. For example, if a restaurant is located in the heart of
a downtown preservation district, but the artwork in question is situated on the
back alley wall of that building, not viewable from the street, the enforcement
commission should apply less rigid standards when considering an artist's
application. This is another middle ground suggestion that will more adequately
balance the First Amendment rights of the artist and the preservation rights of
the municipality.
An enforcement commission that does adjust its investigation to these variables
will avoid undue restriction of the First Amendment rights of an artist with
blanket rationale incapable of flexible application.
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municipalities must be careful not to unnecessarily impede an
artist's protected expression. When an artist's work is completed,
a piece of her soul has been memorialized. The injury to the artist
resulting from alteration, destruction, or removal of that work is
concrete.
Recent moral rights legislation grants artists a
constitutionally cognizable injury and standing to sue if such
alteration, destruction, or removal occurs.
Municipalities must adopt specific standards for review in
preservation dispute proceedings. As the ordinance ages, the
community should be able to adopt specific standards reflecting its
aesthetic theme. Moreover, public hearings must not include
parties injecting subjective artistic opinion that erodes the
enforcement commission's ability to make a content neutral
decision.
These competing interests can coexist, but
municipalities must work to clarify their statutes and ensure
neutral historic preservation decisions which are not scarred by
artistic value judgment.
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